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ABSTRACT
It is yet unclear which teaching methods are most effective for improving critical thinking
(CT) skills and especially for the ability to avoid biased reasoning. Two experiments
(laboratory: N = 85; classroom: N = 117), investigated the effect of practice schedule
(interleaved/blocked) on students’ learning and transfer of unbiased reasoning, and
whether it interacts with practice-task format (worked-examples/problems). After
receiving CT-instructions, participants practiced in: (1) a blocked schedule with worked
examples, (2) an interleaved schedule with worked examples, (3) a blocked schedule
with problems, or (4) an interleaved schedule with problems. In both experiments,
learning outcomes improved after instruction/practice. Surprisingly, there were no
indications that interleaved practice led to better learning/transfer than blocked
practice, irrespective of task format. The practice-task format did matter for novices’
learning: worked examples were more effective than low-assistance practice problems,
which demonstrates –for the first time – that the worked-example effect also applies to
novices’ learning to avoid biased reasoning.
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Every day, we make many decisions that are based
on previous experiences and existing knowledge.
This happens almost automatically as we rely on a
number of heuristics (i.e. mental shortcuts) that
ease reasoning processes (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). Heuristic reasoning is typically useful,
especially in routine situations. But it can also
produce systematic deviations from rational norms
(i.e. biases; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) with far-reaching con-
sequences, particularly in complex professional
environments in which the majority of higher edu-
cation graduates are employed (e.g. medicine:
Ajayi & Okudo, 2016; Elia et al., 2016; Mamede
et al., 2010; Law: Koehler et al., 2002). Our primary
tool for avoiding bias in reasoning and decision-
making (hereafter referred to as unbiased reasoning;
e.g. Flores et al., 2012; West et al., 2008) is critical
thinking (CT). CT-skills are key to effective communi-
cation, problem solving, and decision-making in
both daily life and professional environments (e.g.
Billings & Roberts, 2014; Darling-Hammond, 2010;
Kuhn, 2005). Consequently, people who have
difficulty with CT are more susceptible to making
illogical and biased decisions that can have
serious consequences. Given the importance of CT
for successful functioning in today’s society, it is
worrying that many students struggle with several
aspects of CT. Hence, it is not surprising that
helping students to become critically thinking pro-
fessionals is a major aim of higher education.
However, it is not yet clear what teaching
methods are most effective, especially to establish
transfer (e.g. Van Peppen et al., 2018; Heijltjes
et al., 2014a; Heijltjes et al., 2014b, 2015), which
refers to the ability to apply acquired knowledge
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and skills in new situations (Halpern, 1998; Perkins &
Salomon, 1992).
Contextual interference in instruction
According to the contextual interference effect,
greater transfer is established when materials are
presented and learned under conditions of high
contextual interference (Schneider et al., 2002).
High contextual interference can be created by
varying practice-tasks from trial to trial (e.g. Battig,
1978). This task variability induces reflection on to-
be-used procedures and can help learners to recog-
nise distinctive characteristics of different problem
types (i.e. inter-task comparing) and to develop
more elaborate cognitive schemata that contribute
to selecting and using a learned procedure when
solving similar problems (evidencing learning) and
new problems (evidencing transfer; Barreiros et al.,
2007; Moxley, 1979).
High contextual interference can be achieved by
interleaved practice as opposed to blocked practice.
Whereas blocked practice involves practicing one
task-category at a time before the next (e.g.
AAABBBCCC), interleaved practice mixes practice
of several categories together (e.g. ABCBACBCA).
To illustrate, a blocked schedule of mathematics
tasks first offers practice tasks on volumes of
cubes and thereafter practice tasks on volumes of
cylinders. An interleaved schedule, on the other
hand, offers a mix of practice tasks on volumes of
cubes and cylinders. It has been suggested that
reflection on the to-be-used procedures is what
causes the beneficial effect of interleaved practice
(e.g. Barreiros et al., 2007; Rau et al., 2010). There-
fore, distinctiveness between task categories
should be high enough to reflect what strategy is
required, but, on the other hand, should not be
too high because learners then immediately recog-
nise what procedure to apply. Additionally, the
Sequential Attention Theory (Carvalho & Goldstone,
2019) states that an interleaved schedule highlights
differences between items, whereas a blocked sche-
dule highlights similarities between items. Thus,
interleaved practice is assumed to be beneficial
when differences between categories are crucial
for acquiring the category structure. Hence, it is
important for beneficial effects of interleaved
practice to occur that distinctiveness between cat-
egories is high, but distinctiveness within task cat-
egories is low (Zulkiply & Burt, 2013). Research on
interleaved practice has frequently demonstrated
positive learning effects (for a recent meta-analysis,
see Brunmair & Richter, 2019), for example in labora-
tory studies with troubleshooting tasks (De Croock
et al., 1998; De Croock & van Merriënboer, 2007;
Van Merriënboer et al., 1997, 2002); drawing tasks
(Albaret & Thon, 1998); foreign language learning
(Abel & Roediger, 2017; Carpenter & Mueller, 2013;
Schneider et al., 2002); category induction tasks
(Kornell & Bjork, 2008; Sana et al., 2018; Wahlheim
et al., 2011); and learning of logical rules (Schneider
et al., 1995). Furthermore, several classroom exper-
iments found positive effects of interleaved practice
in mathematics learning (e.g. Rau et al., 2013; Rohrer
et al., 2014, 2015, 2019), and in astronomy learning
(Richland et al., 2005).
The effect of interleaved practice on performance
on reasoning tasks has received scant attention in
the literature. However, it has been demonstrated
with complex judgment tasks that interleaved prac-
tice enhanced not only learning but also transfer
performance (Helsdingen et al., 2011a, 2011b). In
these tasks, participants had to identify relevant
cues in case descriptions of, for instance, crimes to
estimate priorities of urgency for the police.
Although this type of task seems is different from
tasks typically used to assess unbiased reasoning
(i.e. “heuristics-and-biases tasks”; we will elaborate
on these tasks in the materials subsection), both
rely on evaluation and interpretation of available
information for making appropriate judgments. As
such, interleaved practice may have similar effects
on learning and transfer of unbiased reasoning.
It is important to note, however, that interleaved
practice is usually more cognitively demanding than
blocked practice, that is, it places a higher demand
on limited working memory resources. Given that
it also usually results in better (long-term) learning,
interleaved practice seems to impose germane cog-
nitive load (Sweller et al., 2011), or “desirable
difficulties” (Bjork, 1994). Desirable difficulties are
techniques that are effortful during learning and
may seem to temporarily hold back performance
gains, but are beneficial for long-term performance.
Nevertheless, there is a risk that learners, and
especially novices, will experience excessively high
cognitive load when engaging in interleaved prac-
tice, which may hinder learning because it results
in the learner being unable to process and
compare all relevant information across tasks (Paas
& Van Merriënboer, 1994). Using a practice-task
format that reduces unnecessary cognitive load,
like worked examples (i.e. step-by-step
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demonstrations of the problem solution; Paas et al.,
2003; Renkl, 2014; Sweller, 1988; Van Gog et al.,
2019; Van Gog & Rummel, 2010) may help novices
benefit from high contextual interference. The
high level of guidance during learning from
worked examples provides learners with the oppor-
tunity to devote attention towards processes –
stimulated by interleaved practice – that are directly
relevant for learning. As such, learners can use the
freed up cognitive capacity to reflect on to-be-
used procedures and develop cognitive schemata
that contribute to selecting and using a learned pro-
cedure when solving similar and novel problems
(Kalyuga, 2011; Renkl, 2014). Paas and Van Merriën-
boer (1994) indeed found that high variability
during practice produced transfer test performance
benefits (geometrical problem solving) when stu-
dents studied worked examples, but not when
they solved practice problems. Moreover, students
who studied worked examples perceived that they
invested less mental effort in solving the transfer
tasks than did the students who had solved practice
problems.
The present study
The aim of the present study was to investigate
whether there would be an effect of interleaved
practice with heuristics-and-biases tasks on experi-
enced cognitive load, learning outcomes, and trans-
fer performance (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)
and whether this effect would interact with the
format of the practice-tasks (i.e. worked examples
or practice problems). We simultaneously con-
ducted 2 experiments: Experiment 1 was conducted
in a laboratory setting with university students and
Experiment 2 served as a conceptual replication
conducted in a real classroom setting with students
of a university of applied sciences.1 Participants
received instructions on CT and heuristics and
biases tasks, followed by practice with these tasks.
Figure 1 displays an overview of the study design:
performance was measured as performance on
practiced tasks (learning) and non-practiced tasks
(transfer), and on a pretest, immediate posttest,
and delayed posttest (two weeks later).
In line with previous findings (Van Peppen et al.,
2018, submitted; Heijltjes et al., 2014a; Heijltjes et al.,
2014b, 2015), we hypothesised that students would
benefit from the CT-instructions and practice activi-
ties, as evidenced by pretest to immediate posttest
gains in performance on practiced items (i.e. learn-
ing; Hypothesis 1). Regarding our main question
(see schematic overview in Table 1), we expected
a main effect of interleaved practice, indicating
that interleaved practice would require more effort
during the practice phase (Hypothesis 2), but
would also lead to larger performance gains on
practiced items (i.e. learning; Hypothesis 3a) and
higher performance on non-practiced items (i.e.
transfer; Hypothesis 3b) than blocked practice. We
also expected a main effect of practice-task
format: conform the worked example effect, we
expected that studying worked examples would
be less effortful during the practice phase (Hypoth-
esis 4) and would lead to larger performance gains
on practiced items (i.e. learning; Hypothesis 5a)
and higher performance on non-practiced items
(i.e. transfer; Hypothesis 5b) than solving problems.
Finally, we expected an interaction effect, indicating
that the beneficial effect of interleaved practice
would be larger with worked examples than prac-
tice problems, on both practiced (i.e. learning;
Hypothesis 6a) and non-practiced (i.e. transfer;
Hypothesis 6b) items. A delayed (two weeks later)
posttest was included, on which we expected
these effects (Hypotheses 1-6) to persist. As effects
of generative processing (relative to non-generative
learning strategies; Dunlosky et al., 2013) and of
interleaved practice specifically (Rohrer et al.,
2015) sometimes increase as time goes by, they
may be even greater after a delay.
Despite not having specific expectations, the
mental effort during test data can provide additional
insights into the effects of interleaved practice and
worked examples on learning (Question 7a/8a) and
transfer (Question 7b/8b). As people gain expertise,
they can often attain an equal/higher level of per-
formance with less/equal effort investment, respect-
ively. As such, an effort investment decrease in
instructed and practiced test items would indicate
higher cognitive efficiency (Hoffman & Schraw,
2010; Van Gog & Paas, 2008).2
1The Dutch education system distinguishes between research-oriented higher education (i.e. offered by research universities) and profession-
oriented higher education (i.e. offered by universities of applied sciences).
2We also exploratively analyzed students’ global judgments of learning (JOLs) after practice to gain insight into how informative the different prac-
tice types were according to the students themselves; however, these analyses did not have much added value for this paper, and, therefore, are
not reported here but provided on our OSF-page.
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Experiment 1
Materials and methods
We created an Open Science Framework (OSF) page
for this project, where detailed descriptions of the
experimental design and procedures are provided
and where all data and materials (in Dutch) can be
found (osf.io/a9czu).
Participants
Participants were 112 first-year Psychology students
of a Dutch university. Of these, 104 students (93%)
were present at both experimental sessions (see
the procedure subsection for more information),
and only their data were analysed. Participants
were excluded from the analyses when test or prac-
tice sessions were not completed or when instruc-
tions were not adhered to, i.e. when more than
half of the practice tasks were not read seriously.
Based on the fact that fast readers can read no
more than 350 words per minute (e.g. Trauzettel-
Klosinski & Dietz, 2012) – and the words in these
tasks additionally require understanding – we
assumed that participants who spent less than
0.17 s per word (i.e. 60 s/350 words) did not read
the instructions seriously. This involved more
participants from the worked examples conditions
than the practice problems conditions and resulted
in a final sample of 85 students (Mage = 19.84, SD =
2.41; 14 males). Based on this sample size, we have
calculated a power function of our analyses using
the G*Power software (Faul et al., 2009). The
power of Experiment 1 – under a fixed alpha level
of 0.05 and with a correlation between measures
of 0.3 (e.g. Van Peppen et al., 2018) – is estimated
at .24 for detecting a small interaction effect (h2p
= .01), .96 for a medium interaction effect (h2p
= .06), and > .99 for a large interaction effect (h2p
= .14). Thus, the power of our experiment should
be sufficient to pick up medium-sized interaction
effects, which is in line with the moderate overall
positive effect of interleaved practice of previous
studies as indicated in a recent meta-analysis (g =
0.42; Brunmair & Richter, 2019).3
Design
The experiment consisted of four phases (see Figure
1): pretest, learning phase (CT-instructions plus
practice), immediate posttest, and delayed posttest.
A 3 × 2 × 2 design was used, with Test Moment
(pretest, immediate posttest, and delayed posttest)














Session 1 Session 2
Figure 1. Overview of the study design. The four conditions differed in practice activities during the learning phase.
Table 1. Schematic overview of hypotheses 2–6.
Mental effort during
learning Test performance
Learning items Transfer items
Practice schedule Interleaved > Blocked
(hypothesis 2)
Interleaved > Blocked (hypothesis 3a) Interleaved > Blocked (hypothesis 3b)
Practice-task format Examples < Problems
(hypothesis 4)
Examples > Problems (hypothesis 5a) Examples > Problems (hypothesis 5b)
Interaction Practice schedule
and Practice-task format
Effect Interleaved over Blocked:
Examples > Problems (hypothesis 6a)
Effect Interleaved over Blocked:
Examples > Problems (hypothesis 6b)
Note: Additional research questions were formulated regarding the mental effort invested in the test (Question 7 and 8), but these are not provided
in this table because we did not have specific expectations.
3In response to a reviewer, we have calculated power functions of our post hoc analyses. The power of the comparison between interleaved prac-
tice and blocked practice, under a fixed alpha level of 0.05, is estimated at .15, .62, and .95 for detecting a small (d = .02), medium (d = .05), and
large (d = .08) effect, respectively. The power of the comparison between worked examples and practice problems is estimated at .15, .60, and .95
for detecting a small, medium, and large effect, respectively. Thus, the power of our experiment should be sufficient to pick up medium-to-large-
sized effects. However, the power to pick up a differential effect of interleaved practice with worked examples compared to practice problems
seems relatively low, to wit, .09, .33, and .67 for detection of a small, medium, or large effect, respectively.
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(interleaved and blocked) and Practice-task Format
(worked examples and practice problems) as
between-subjects factors. After completing the
pretest on learning items (i.e. instructed and prac-
ticed during the learning phase), participants
received instructions and were randomly assigned
to one of four practice conditions: (1) Blocked Sche-
dule with Worked Examples Condition (n = 18); (2)
Blocked Schedule with Practice Problems Condition
(n = 28); (3) Interleaved Schedule with Worked
Examples Condition (n = 17); and (4) Interleaved
Schedule with Practice Problems Condition (n =
22). Subsequently, participants completed the
immediate posttest and two weeks later the
delayed posttest on learning items (i.e. instructed
and practiced during the learning phase) and trans-
fer items (i.e. not instructed and practiced during
the learning phase).
Materials
All materials were delivered in a computer-based
environment (Qualtrics platform) that is created
for this study.
CT-skills tests. The CT-skills pretest consisted of
nine classic heuristics-and-biases items across
three categories (e.g. West et al., 2008) which we
refer to as learning items as (isomorphs of) these
items were instructed and practiced during the
learning phase, (example-items in Appendix): (1)
Base-rate items which measured the tendency to
overweigh individual-case evidence, that is,
specific information (e.g. from personal experience,
a single case, or prior beliefs) and to undervalue
statistical information (Stanovich et al., 2016; Stano-
vich & West, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); (2)
Conjunction items that measured to what extent
the conjunction rule (P(A&B) ≤ P(B)) is neglected –
this fundamental rule in probability theory states
that the probability of Event A and Event B both
occurring must be lower than the probability of
Event A or Event B occurring alone (adapted from
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983); (3) Syllogistic reasoning
items that examined the tendency to be influenced
by the believability of a conclusion when evaluating
the logical validity of arguments (Evans, 2003). As
mentioned previously, it is important for interleaved
practice effects to occur that distinctiveness
between categories is high enough to reflect what
strategy is required but, on the other hand, is not
too high because learners then immediately recog-
nise what procedure to apply (see for example,
Brunmair & Richter, 2019; Carvalho & Goldstone,
2019). Therefore, we combined lower distinctive
task categories (i.e. only requiring knowledge and
rules of statistics: base-rate vs. conjunction) with
higher distinctive task categories (i.e. requiring
knowledge and rules of statistics and logic: base-
rate vs. syllogistic reasoning and conjunction vs. syl-
logistic reasoning).
The immediate and delayed posttest contained
parallel versions of the nine pretest learning items
across three categories (base-rate, conjunction,
and syllogism) that were designed as structurally
equivalent but with different surface features. To
illustrate, an immediate posttest item contained
the exact same wording as the respective pretest
item but, for instance, described a different
company. In addition, the immediate and delayed
posttests also contained four items of two task-cat-
egories that were transfer items as these were not
instructed and practiced during the learning
phase. The transfer items shared similar features
with the learning items, namely, requiring knowl-
edge and rules of logic (i.e. syllogisms rules) or
requiring knowledge and rules of statistics (i.e. prob-
ability and data interpretation), respectively: (1)
Wason selection items which measured the ten-
dency to confirm a hypothesis rather than to
falsify it (adapted from Evans, 2002; Gigerenzer &
Hug, 1992); and (2) Contingency items measured
the tendency to judge information given in a con-
tingency table unequally, based on already experi-
enced evidence (Heijltjes et al., 2014a; Stanovich &
West, 2000; Wasserman et al., 1990).
In the interleaved schedule, all items were
offered in random order and in the blocked sche-
dule the items were randomly offered within the
blocks. A multiple-choice (MC) format with
different numbers of alternatives per item was
used, with only one correct alternative for each
task that evidences unbiased reasoning. The incor-
rect alternatives were intuitive (and incorrect)
responses or results of incomplete reasoning pro-
cesses. The content of the surface features (cover
stories) of all test items was adapted to the study
domain of the participants. All conditions were
pilot-tested on difficulty, duration, and representa-
tiveness of content (for the study programme) by
some students from a university of applied sciences
(not partaking in the main experiments). Moreover,
several tasks were taken from previous studies that
were conducted in similar contexts (i.e. within an
existing CT-course with first-year or second-year
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students of a university of applied sciences; Heijltjes
et al., 2014a; Heijltjes et al., 2014b, 2015) and even
within the same study domain (Van Peppen et al.,
2018).
CT-instructions. The video-based instruction con-
sisted of a general instruction on CT and explicit
instructions on three heuristics-and-biases tasks. In
the general instruction, the features of CT and the
attitudes and skills that are needed to think critically
were described. Thereafter, participants received
explicit instructions on how to avoid base-rate falla-
cies, conjunction fallacies, and biases in syllogistic
reasoning. These instructions consisted of a
worked example of each category that not only
showed the correct line of reasoning but also
included possible problem-solving strategies. The
worked examples provided solutions to the tasks
seen in the pretest, which allowed participants to
mentally correct initially erroneous responses.
CT-practice. The CT-practice phase consisted of
nine practice tasks across the three task categories
– in random order – of the pretest and the explicit
instructions: base-rate (Br), conjunction (C), and syl-
logistic reasoning (S). Depending on the assigned
condition, participants had to practice either in an
interleaved (e.g. Br–C-S–C-S-Br-S-Br–C) or blocked
schedule (e.g. Br-Br-Br–C-C–C-S-S-S), and either
with worked examples or practice problems. Partici-
pants in the practice problems conditions were
instructed to read the tasks thoroughly and to
choose the best answer option. They received a
prompt after each of the tasks in which they were
asked to explain how the answer was obtained.
After that, participants received feedback indicating
whether the given answer was correct or incorrect
(i.e. “your answer to this assignment was correct”
or “your answer to this assignment was incorrect”).
Participants in the worked examples conditions
were first told that they would not have to solve
the problems themselves, but that they receive a
worked-out solution to each problem. They were
instructed to read each worked-out example
thoroughly. The worked examples consisted of a
problem statement and a solution to this problem
(i.e. the strategy information provided during the
CT-instructions was repeated in the worked
examples). The line of reasoning and underlying
principles were explained in steps, sometimes
clarified with a visual representation. The expla-
nations given in the worked examples were based
on the explanations from the original literature on
the tasks (e.g. “to solve this problem you should
…”) and have been rewritten to make it look like
another student has completed the task (e.g. “to
solve this problem, I am…”). Thus, the worked
examples consisted of more elaborate information
compared to the practice problems.
Mental effort. Invested mental effort was measured
with the subjective rating scale developed by Paas
(1992). After each practice-task and after each test
item, participants reported how much mental
effort they invested in completing that task or
item, on a 9-point scale ranging from (1) very, very
low effort to (9) very, very high effort.
Procedure
The study was run in two sessions that both took
place in the computer lab of the university. Partici-
pants signed an informed consent form at the
start of the experiment. Before participants arrived,
A4-papers were distributed among all cubicles
(one participant in each cubicle) containing some
general rules and a link to the Qualtrics environ-
ment of session 1, where all materials were deliv-
ered. Participants could work at their own pace
and time-on-task was logged during all phases. Fur-
thermore, participants were allowed to use scrap
paper during the practice phase and the CT-tests.
In session 1 (ca. 75 min), participants first filled
out a demographic questionnaire and then com-
pleted the pretest. After each test item, they had
to indicate how much mental effort they invested
in it. Subsequently, participants entered the learn-
ing phase in which they first viewed the video (10
min.), including the general CT-instruction and the
explicit instructions. Thereafter, the Qualtrics pro-
gramme randomly assigned the participants to
one of the four practice conditions. Participants
rated after each practice task how much mental
effort they invested. After the learning phase, par-
ticipants completed the immediate posttest and
again rated their invested mental effort after each
test item. The second session took place two
weeks later and lasted circa 20 min. Participants
again received an A4-paper containing some
general rules and a link to the Qualtrics environ-
ment of session 2. This time, participants completed
the delayed posttest and again reported their
mental effort ratings after each test item. One exper-
iment leader (first or third author of this paper) was
present during all phases of the experiment.
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Data analysis. Of the nine learning items of the CT-
skills tests, seven itemswereMC-only questions (with
more than two alternatives) and two items were MC-
plus-motivation questions (with twoMCalternatives;
one conjunction and one base-rate item) to prevent
participants from guessing. The transfer items con-
sisted of two MC-only and two MC-plus-motivation
questions (two contingency items). Performance on
the pretest, immediate posttest, and delayed postt-
est was scored by assigning 1 point to each correct
alternative on the MC-only questions (i.e. referring
to unbiased reasoning). For items with only two MC
alternatives, the scoring was based on the expla-
nation provided so that no points were assigned
for correct guesses. Participants could earn 1 point
for the correct explanation, 0.5 point for a partially
correct explanation,4 and 0 points for an incorrect
explanation for these MC-plus-motivation questions
(score formdevelopedby the first author). As a result,
participants could earn amaximum score of 9 on the
learning items and amaximum total score of 4 on the
transfer items. Two raters independently scored 25%
of the explanations on the open questions of the
immediate posttest, blind to student identity and
condition. The intra-class correlation coefficient
was .991 for the learning test items and .986 for the
transfer test items. Because of the high inter-rater
reliability, the remainder of the tests was scored by
one rater (the first author) and this rater’s scores
were used in the analyses..
For comparability, we computed percentage
scores on the learning and transfer items instead
of total scores. It is important to realise that, even
though we used percentage scores, caution is war-
ranted in interpreting differences between learning
and transfer outcomes because the maximum
scores differed. The mean score on the posttest
learning items was 59.9% (SD = 20.22) and reliability
of these items (Cronbach’s alpha) was .24 on the
pretest, .57 on the immediate posttest, and .51 on
the delayed posttest. The low reliability on the
pretest might be explained by the fact that a lack
of prior knowledge requires guessing of answers.
As such, inter-item correlations are low, resulting
in a low Cronbach’s alpha. Moreover, caution is
required in interpreting these reliabilities because
sample sizes as in studies like this do not seem to
produce sufficiently precise alpha coefficients (e.g.
Charter, 2003). The mean score on the posttest
transfer items was 36.2% (SD = 22.31). Reliability of
these items was low (Cronbach’s alpha of .25 on
the posttest and .43 on the delayed posttest),
which can probably partly be explained by floor
effects at both tests for one of our transfer task cat-
egories (i.e. Wason selection). Therefore, we decided
not to report the test statistics of the analyses on
transfer performance. Descriptive statistics can be
found in Tables 2 and 3.
Results
In all analyses reported below, a significance level of
.05 was used. Partial eta-squared (h2p) is reported as
a measure of effect size for the ANOVAs for which
0.01 is considered small, 0.06 medium, and 0.14
large (Cohen, 1988). On our OSF-project page we
presented the intention-to-treat (i.e. all participants
who entered the study) analyses, which did not
reveal noteworthy differences with the compliant-
only (i.e. all participants who have met the criterion
of spending more than 0.17 s per word for at least
half of the practice tasks) analyses reported below.
Check on condition equivalence and time-on-
task
Following the drop-out of some participants, we
checked our conditions on equivalence. Preliminary
analyses confirmed that the conditions did not
differ in educational background, χ²(15) = 15.68, p
= .403; performance on the pretest, F(3, 81) = 1.68,
p = .178; time spent on the pretest, F(3, 81) = 1.75, p
= .164; and average mental effort invested on the
pretest items, F(3, 81) = 0.78, p = .510. We found a
gender difference between the conditions, χ²(3) =
11.03, p = .012. However, gender did not correlate sig-
nificantly with learning performance (minimum p
= .108) andwas therefore not a confounding variable.
A 2 (Practice Schedule: interleaved vs. blocked) × 2
(Practice-task Format: worked examples vs. practice
problems) factorial ANOVA showed no significant
differences on time-on-task during practice between
the interleaved and blocked conditions, F(3, 81) =
3.05, p = .085, h2p = .04, but there was a significant
difference between worked examples conditions (M
= 577.48, SE = 37.93) compared to the practice pro-
blems conditions (M = 737.61, SE = 31.96), F(3, 81) =
4That is, when half of the necessary information was given. To illustrate, a correct explanation on a contingency table involves correct consideration
of the information presented in the rows and columns, while a partially correct explanation only involves consideration of either the information
in the rows or the information in the columns.
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10.42, p = .002,h2p = .11. If it turns out that the practice
problems conditions outperformed the worked
examples conditions, this finding should be taken
into account. No significant interaction between Prac-
tice Schedule andPractice-task Formatwas found, F(3,
81) = 1.00, p = .320, h2p = .01.
5












Learning items Pretest 23.46 (13.14) 29.37 (13.60) 24.18 (11.94) 20.20 (13.56)
Immediate posttest 65.43 (23.15) 55.95 (18.27) 71.90 (18.89) 51.01 (15.96)
Delayed posttest 68.86 (19.53) 59.13 (17.12) 73.86 (17.98) 53.54 (15.58)
Transfer items Immediate posttest 43.06 (22.37) 40.63 (22.21) 36.03 (19.71) 26.70 (22.26)
Delayed posttest 47.22 (24.08) 45.54 (18.07) 39.71 (28.03) 50.00 (18.90)
Mental effort during test
Learning items Pretest 3.47 (0.99) 3.73 (0.66) 3.84 (0.63) 3.76 (0.89)
Immediate posttest 3.28 (1.23) 3.97 (0.99) 3.80 (0.58) 3.80 (0.90)
Delayed posttest 3.25 (1.01) 4.09 (0.97) 3.80 (0.88) 4.20 (0.88)
Transfer items Immediate posttest 4.14 (1.38) 4.81 (1.10) 4.85 (0.72) 4.81 (0.97)
Delayed posttest 3.81 (1.45) 4.57 (0.80) 4.46 (0.98) 5.01 (0.94)
Mental effort during learning 3.51 (0.26) 4.05 (0.21) 4.20 (0.26) 4.11 (0.23)
Table 3. Means (SD) of Test performance per task (max. score 1) per Condition of Experiment 1.
Instructional conditions
Blocked Examples Blocked Problems Interleaved Examples Interleaved Problems
Syllogism 1 Pretest 0.67 (0.49) 0.75 (0.44) 0.53 (0.51) 0.55 (0.51)
Immediate posttest 0.50 (0.51) 0.43 (0.50) 0.47 (0.51) 0.55 (0.51)
Delayed posttest 0.78 (0.43) 0.54 (0.51) 0.65 (0.49) 0.64 (0.49)
Syllogism 2 Pretest 0.06 (0.24) 0.14 (0.36) 0.00 (0.00) 0.09 (0.29)
Immediate posttest 0.61 (0.50) 0.64 (0.49) 0.71 (0.47) 0.55 (0.51)
Delayed posttest 0.39 (0.50) 0.39 (0.50) 0.47 (0.51) 0.27 (0.46)
Syllogism 3 Pretest 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.39) 0.00 (0.00) 0.14 (0.35)
Immediate posttest 0.33 (0.49) 0.18 (0.39) 0.71 (0.47) 0.09 (0.29)
Delayed posttest 0.56 (0.51) 0.64 (0.49) 0.71 (0.47) 0.55 (0.51)
Base-rate 1 Pretest 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.19) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Immediate posttest 0.56 (0.51) 0.46 (0.51) 0.65 (0.49) 0.36 (0.49)
Delayed posttest 0.44 (0.51) 0.50 (0.51) 0.71 (0.47) 0.27 (0.46)
Base-rate 2 Pretest 0.06 (0.27) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Immediate posttest 0.44 (0.51) 0.04 (0.19) 0.24 (0.44) 0.00 (0.00)
Delayed posttest 0.28 (0.46) 0.00 (0.00) 0.24 (0.44) 0.00 (0.00)
Base-rate 3 Pretest 0.67 (0.49) 0.79 (0.42) 0.82 (0.39) 0.59 (0.50)
Immediate posttest 0.89 (0.32) 0.79 (0.42) 1.00 (0.00) 0.68 (0.48)
Delayed posttest 1.00 (0.00) 0.75 (0.44) 1.00 (0.00) 0.68 (0.48)
Conjunction 1 Pretest 0.11 (0.32) 0.14 (0.36) 0.24 (0.44) 0.18 (0.39)
Immediate posttest 0.78 (0.43) 0.86 (0.36) 0.88 (0.33) 0.73 (0.46)
Delayed posttest 0.89 (0.32) 0.89 (0.32) 0.88 (0.33) 0.77 (0.43)
Conjunction 2 Pretest 0.22 (0.43) 0.36 (0.49) 0.29 (0.47) 0.18 (0.40)
Immediate posttest 0.83 (0.38) 0.79 (0.42) 0.94 (0.24) 0.77 (0.43)
Delayed 0.94 (0.24) 0.75 (0.44) 1.00 (0.00) 0.82 (0.40)
Conjunction 3 Pretest 0.17 (0.38) 0.25 (0.44) 0.29 (0.47) 0.09 (0.29)
Immediate posttest 0.94 (0.24) 0.86 (.36) 0.88 (0.33) 0.86 (0.35)
Delayed posttest 0.89 (0.32) 0.86 (.36) 1.00 (0.00) 0.82 (0.39)
Wason selection 1 Immediate posttest 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (.32) 0.00 (0.00) 0.14 (0.35)
Delayed posttest 0.06 (0.24) 0.00 (.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.09 (0.29)
Wason selection 2 Immediate posttest 0.17 (0.38) 0.29 (.46) 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35)
Delayed posttest .28 (0.46) 0.18 (.39) 0.29 (0.47) 0.14 (0.35)
Contingency 1 Immediate posttest 0.69 (0.42) 0.61 (.48) 0.65 (0.42) 0.34 (0.42)
Delayed posttest 0.72 (0.46) 0.75 (.42) 0.56 (0.50) 0.68 (0.42)
Contingency 2 Immediate posttest 0.72 (0.43) 0.54 (0.47) 0.68 (0.47) 0.32 (0.45)
Delayed posttest 0.69 (0.42) 0.75 (0.40) 0.59 (0.48) 0.77 (0.34)
5The relatively low reliabilities of the learning items should be taken into account.
8 L. M. VAN PEPPEN ET AL.
Performance on learning items
Performance data are presented in Tables 2 and 3
and all omnibus test statistics can be found in
Table 4 (statistics of follow-up analyses are pre-
sented in text). A 3 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA on the
items that assessed learning, with Test Moment
(pretest, immediate posttest, and delayed posttest)
as within-subjects factor and Practice Schedule
(interleaved and blocked) and Practice-task Format
(worked examples and practice problems) as
between-subjects factors, showed a main effect of
Test Moment. In line with Hypothesis 1, repeated
contrasts revealed that participants performed
better on the immediate posttest (M= 61.07, SE =
2.10) than on the pretest (M= 24.30, SE = 1.46), F(1,
81) = 267.66, p < .001, h2p = .77. There was no signifi-
cant difference between performance on the
immediate and delayed posttest (M= 63.76, SE =
1.93), F(1, 81) = 2.90, p = .092, h2p = .04.
In contrast to Hypothesis 3a (see Table 1 for a
schematic overview of the hypotheses), we did not
find a significant main effect of Practice Schedule
or an interaction between Practice Schedule and
Test Moment on performance on learning items.
However, the analysis did reveal a main effect of
Practice-task Format, with worked examples result-
ing in better performance (M= 54.56, SE = 2.21)
than practice problems (M= 44.87, SE = 1.86). This
was qualified by an interaction effect between Prac-
tice-task Format and Test Moment: in line with
Hypothesis 5a, repeated contrasts revealed that
there was a higher pretest to immediate posttest
performance gain for worked examples (Mpre =
23.82, SE = 2.23; Mimmediate = 68.66, SE = 3.21) than
for practice problems (Mpre = 24.78, SE = 1.88;
Mimmediate = 53.48, SE = 2.70), F(1, 81) = 12.90, p
= .001, h2p = .14. Contrary to Hypothesis 6a, there
was no interaction between Practice Schedule and
Practice-task Format, nor an interaction between
Practice Schedule, Practice-task Format, and Test
Moment.
Mental effort during learning
Mental effort data are presented in Table 2 and all
omnibus test statistics can be found in Table 4. Con-
trary to hypotheses 2 and 4 respectively, a 2 (Prac-
tice Schedule: interleaved and blocked) × 2
(Practice-task Format: worked examples and prac-
tice problems) factorial ANOVA on the mental
effort during practice data revealed no main
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Format. Moreover, no interaction between Practice
Schedule and Practice-task Format was found.
Mental effort during test
We exploratory analysed the mental effort during
test data with a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA on mental
effort invested on learning items and a 2 × 2 × 2
mixed ANOVA on mental effort invested on transfer
items (i.e. transfer items were not included in the
pretest). Mental effort data during test is presented
in Table 2 and all test statistics can be found in
Table 4.
Regarding effort invested in the learning items,
there was nomain effect of Practice Schedule (Ques-
tion 7a). However, there was a main effect of Prac-
tice-task Format (Question 8a); less invested effort
on learning items was reported in the worked
examples conditions (M= 3.57, SE = .13) compared
to practice problems conditions (M= 3.92, SE
= .11), and an interaction effect between Test
Moment and Practice-task Format. Repeated con-
trasts revealed an effort investment increase over
time with a significant difference between immedi-
ate and delayed posttest for the practice problems
conditions (Mpretest = 3.74, SE = .11; Mimmediate =
3.89, SE = .14; Mdelayed = 4.14, SE = .13), F(1,48) =
6.08, p = .017, h2p = .11, and no significant differences
for the worked examples conditions, F(2,66) = .38, p
= .683, h2p = .01. The results did not reveal a main
effect of Test Moment and interaction effects.
Regarding invested mental effort in the transfer
items, the results revealed a main effect of Practice
Schedule (Question 7b), with higher effort invest-
ment when practiced in an interleaved schedule
(M = 4.78, SD = .15) compared to a blocked schedule
(M = 4.33, SD = .14). Furthermore, there was an
effect of Practice-task Format (Question 7b): higher
effort investment was reported by the practice pro-
blems conditions (M = 4.80, SD = .13) compared to
worked examples conditions (M = 4.31, SD = .16).
No main effect of Test Moment and interaction
effects were found.
Interim summary
Taken together, there were no indications that inter-
leaved practice – either in itself or as a function of
task-format – contributed to better learning.
However, interleaved practice resulted in higher
effort investment on transfer items than blocked
practice, which may indicate that interleaved prac-
tice stimulated analytical and effortful reasoning
(i.e. Type 2 processing, e.g. Stanovich, 2011) more
than blocked practice yet without resulting in repla-
cement of the incorrect intuitive response (i.e. Type
1 processing) with the more analytical correct
response. Alternatively, this finding may indicate a
lower cognitive efficiency (Hoffman & Schraw,
2010; Van Gog & Paas, 2008) of interleaved practice
as opposed to blocked practice. Furthermore, in line
with the worked example effect (e.g. Sweller et al.,
2011), studying worked examples was more
effective for learning than solving problems, as
well as more efficient (i.e. higher test performance
reached in less practice time and less mental effort
investment during the test phase; Van Gog & Paas,
2008). We will further elaborate on and discuss the
findings of Experiment 1 in the General Discussion.
Experiment 2
We simultaneously conducted a replication exper-
iment in a classroom setting to assess the robust-
ness of our findings and to increase ecological
validity. All test and practice items were the same
but, if necessary, adapted to the domain of the par-
ticipants to meet the requirements of the study pro-




The design of Experiment 2 was the same as that of
Experiment 1. Participants were 157 second-year
“Safety and Security Management” students of two
locations of a Dutch university of applied sciences.
Students from the first location had some prior
knowledge as they had participated in a study
that included similar heuristics-and-biases tasks in
the first year of their curriculum that was followed
by some lessons on this topic (n = 83), while stu-
dents of the second location (n = 74) had not.
Since the level of prior knowledge may be relevant
(Likourezos et al., 2019), the factor Site will be
included in the main analyses. Of the 157, 117 stu-
dents (75%) were present at both sessions. As a
large number of students missed the second
session, we decided to conduct two separate ana-
lyses on performance and mental effort on learning
items (transfer items were only included in the
immediate and delayed posttest): pretest to
immediate posttest analyses for all students
present during session 1 and immediate posttest
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to delayed posttest analyses for all students present
at both sessions. As in Experiment 1, participants
who did not read the instructions seriously were
excluded of the analyses. This resulted in a final sub-
sample of 117 students (Mage = 20.05, SD = 1.76; 70
males; 60 higher knowledge) for the pretest-
immediate posttest analyses and a final subsample
of 89 students (Mage = 19.92, SD = 1.78; 46 males;
51 higher-knowledge) for the immediate posttest-
delayed posttest analyses. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to the Blocked Schedule with
Worked Examples (n = 20; n = 15); Blocked Schedule
with Practice Problems (n = 43; n = 33); Interleaved
Schedule with Worked Examples (n = 15; n = 8);
and Interleaved Schedule with Practice Problems
(n = 39; n = 32) conditions. Based on these two
sample sizes, we have calculated power functions
of Experiment 2 using the G*Power software (Faul
et al., 2009), including the factor Site. The power
of analysis 1 (n = 117) – under a fixed alpha level
of 0.05 and with a correlation between measures
of 0.3 (e.g. Van Peppen et al., 2018) – is estimated
at .20 for detecting a small interaction effect (h2p
= .01), .93 for a medium interaction effect (h2p
= .06), and > .99 for a large interaction effect (h2p
= .14). Under the same assumptions, the power of
analysis 2 (n = 89) is estimated at .17 for detecting
a small interaction effect (h2p = .01), .82 for a
medium interaction effect (h2p = .06), and > .99 for
a large interaction effect (h2p = .14). Thus, our exper-
iment should be sufficient to pick up medium-sized
interaction effects, which could be expected given
the moderate overall positive effect of interleaved
practice found in previous studies (Brunmair &
Richter, 2019).6
Materials, procedure, and scoring
All data, materials, and detailed descriptions of the
procedures and scoring are provided at the OSF-
page of this project. The same materials were used
as in Experiment 1 but the content of the surface
features (cover stories) was adapted to the domain
of the participants when the original features did
not reflect realistic situations for these participants
to keep the level of difficulty approximately equal
to Experiment 1 and to meet the requirements of
the study programme (i.e. the final exam was
based on these materials). The content of all
materials was evaluated, including equivalence of
information, and approved by a teacher working
in the domain.
The main difference with Experiment 1 was that
Experiment 2 was run in a real education setting,
namely during the lessons of a CT-course. Exper-
iment 2 was conducted in a computer classroom at
the participants’ school with an entire class of stu-
dents present. Participants came from eight
different classes (of 25–31 participants) and were
randomly distributed among the four conditions
within each class. The two sessions of Experiment 2
took place during the first two lessons and
between these lessons no CT- instruction was
given. In advance of the first session, students were
informed about the experiment by their teacher.
When entering the classroom, participants were
instructed to sit down at one of the desks and read
the A4-paper containing some general instructions
and a link to the Qualtrics environment of session 1
where they first signed an informed consent form.
Again, participants could work at their own pace
and could use scrap paper and time-on-task was
logged during all phases. Participants had to wait
(in silence) until the last participant had finished
the posttest before they were allowed to leave the
classroom. The experiment leader and the teacher
of the CT-course (first and third author of this
paper) were both present during all phases of the
experiment and one of them explained the nature
of the experiment afterwards.
The same test-items and score form for the open
questions were used as in Experiment 1. Again, par-
ticipants could attain a maximum score of 9 on the
learning items and a maximum total score of 4 on
the transfer items and we computed percentage
scores on the learning and transfer items instead
of total scores. It is important to realise that, even
though we used percentage scores, caution is war-
ranted in interpreting differences between learning
and transfer outcomes because the maximum
scores differed. Two raters independently scored
6In response to a reviewer, we calculated power functions of our post hoc analyses. The power of the comparison between interleaved practice and
blocked practice, under a fixed alpha level of 0.05, is estimated at .19, .76, and >.99 (analysis 1) and .15, .64, and .96 (analysis 2) for detecting a
small (d = .02), medium (d = .05), and large (d = .08) effect, respectively. The power of the comparison between worked examples and practice
problems is estimated at .17, .69, and .98 (analysis 1) and .13, .53, and .90 (analysis 2), for detecting a small, medium, and large effect, respectively.
Thus, the power of our experiment should be sufficient to pick up medium-to-large-sized effects of interleaved practice vs. blocked practice and
large-sized effects of worked examples vs. practice problems. However, the power to pick up a differential effect of interleaved practice with
worked examples compared to practice problems seems relatively low, to wit, .10, .37, and .73 (analysis 1) and .08, .23, and .50 (analysis 2)
for detection of a small, medium, or large effect, respectively.
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25% of the open questions of the immediate postt-
est, blind to student identity and condition. Because
the intra-class correlation coefficient was high (.931
for learning test items; .929 for transfer test items),
the remainder of the tests was scored by one rater
(the third author) and this rater’s scores were used
in the analyses.
The mean score on the posttest learning items
was 62.5% (SD = 19.06) and reliability of these
items was .36 on the pretest, .45 on the posttest
and .52 on the delayed posttest (Cronbach’s alpha).
Again, the low reliability on the pretest might be
explained by the fact that a lack of prior knowledge
requires guessing of answers, resulting in low inter-
item correlations and subsequently a low Cronbach’s
alpha. Moreover, caution is warranted in interpreting
these reliabilities because a sample size as in our
study does not seem to produce precise alpha coeffi-
cients (e.g. Charter, 2003). The mean score on the
posttest transfer items was 32.2% (SD = 25.55) and
reliability of these items was .36 on the posttest
and .30 on the delayed posttest (Cronbach’s alpha).
In view of this low reliability, which can probably
partly be explained by floor effects at both tests
for one of our transfer task categories (i.e. Wason
selection), we decided not to report the test statistics
of the analyses on transfer performance. Descriptive
statistics can be found in Tables 5 and 6.
Results
In all analyses reported below, a significance level of
.05 was used. Partial eta-squared (h2p) is reported as
a measure of effect size for the ANOVAs for which
0.01 is considered small, 0.06 medium, and 0.14
large. On our OSF-project page we presented the
intention-to-treat (i.e. all participants who entered
the study) analyses, which did not reveal note-
worthy differences with the compliant-only ana-
lyses. As it might have been of influence that half
of the students had some prior knowledge as they
participated in a study that included similar heuris-
tics-and-biases tasks in the first year of their curricu-
lum, we included the factor Site in all analyses.
Check on condition equivalence and time-on-
task
Preliminary analyses confirmed that there were no
significant differences between the conditions in
educational background, χ²(9) = 10.00, p = .350;
gender, χ²(3) = .318, p = .957, or performance on
the pretest, time spent on the pretest, and mental
effort invested on the pretest items (maximum F =
1.30, maximum h2p = .03). A one-way ANOVA indi-
cated that there were no significant differences in
time-on-task (in seconds) spent on practice of the
instruction tasks, F(3, 116) = 1.73, p = .165, d = .016.7
Table 5. Means (SD) of Test performance (multiple-choice % score) and Invested Mental Effort (1-9) per condition and












Learning items Pretest 35.56 (20.58) 41.09 (20.65) 40.00 (20.91) 43.59 (27.55)
Immediate posttest 68.33 (15.83) 56.85 (21.17) 75.56 (15.83) 60.68 (16.49)
Mental effort during test
Learning items Pretest 3.81 (0.99) 4.01 (.87) 3.97 (1.09) 4.23 (1.08)
Immediate posttest 3.78 (1.10) 3.86 (1.09) 3.78 (1.10) 4.36 (0.95)
Analysis 2
Test Performance
Learning items Immediate posttest 68.15 (16.19) 58.25 (21.70) 72.22 (18.78) 62.50 (14.87)
Delayed posttest 71.85 (16.19) 63.64 (22.95) 70.83 (19.64) 70.14 (13.37)
Transfer items Immediate posttest 30.83 (22.04) 27.65 (22.04) 26.39 (19.21) 30.86 (26.56)
Delayed posttest 35.83 (19.97) 32.20 (21.43) 33.33 (20.84) 28.13 (22.67)
Mental effort during test
Learning items Immediate posttest 3.80 (1.11) 3.83 (0.99) 3.65 (1.65) 4.42 (0.97)
Delayed posttest 3.83 (1.23) 4.16 (1.01) 3.90 (1.62) 4.03 (1.18)
Transfer items Immediate posttest 4.74 (1.10) 4.88 (1.06) 4.69 (2.25) 5.44 (1.35)
Delayed posttest 4.27 (1.50) 5.18 (1.18) 5.00 (2.07) 5.21 (1.24)
Mental effort during learning 3.84 (1.10) 4.05 (1.11) 3.97 (1.05) 4.48 (0.85)
Note. Analysis 1 concerns the pretest to immediate posttest analysis for all students present during session 1 and analysis 2 concerns the immediate
posttest to delayed posttest analysis for all students present during both sessions.
7The relatively low reliabilities of the learning items should be taken into account.
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Performance on learning items
Performance data are presented in Table 5 and 6
and omnibus test statistics in Table 7 (statistics of
follow-up analyses are presented in text). The data
on learning items were analysed with two 2 × 2 ×
2 × 2 mixed ANOVAs with Test Moment (analysis 1:
pretest and immediate posttest; analysis 2: immedi-
ate posttest and delayed posttest) as within-sub-
jects factor and Practice Schedule (interleaved and
blocked), Practice-task Format (worked examples
and practice problems), and Site (low prior knowl-
edge and higher prior knowledge learners) as
between-subjects factors. In line with Hypothesis
1, the pretest-immediate posttest analysis showed
a main effect of Test Moment on learning outcomes:
participants performed better on the immediate
posttest (M= 61.40, SE = 1.49) than on the pretest
(M= 46.13, SE = 1.59).
Contrary to Hypothesis 3a (see Table 1 for a sche-
matic overview of the hypotheses), the results did
not reveal a significant main effect of Practice
Schedule, nor an interaction with Test Moment, indi-
cating that interleaved practice had no differential
effect. We did find an interaction effect between
Test Moment and Practice-task Format: in line with
Hypothesis 5a, there was a higher pretest to
immediate posttest performance gain for worked
examples (Mpre = 38.79; Mimmediate = 71.96) than for
practice problems (Mpre = 41.71; Mimmediate = 58.24),
F(1, 109) = 22.18, p < .001, h2p = .17. In contrast to
Hypothesis 6a, the results did not reveal an inter-
action between Practice Schedule and Practice-
task Format, nor an interaction between Practice
Schedule, Practice-task Format, and Test Moment.
However, there was a main effect of Site, with
higher-knowledge learners performing better (M=
60.95, SE = 2.00) than low-knowledge learners (M=
44.39, SE = 1.97). Moreover, we found an interaction
between Test Moment and Site, with a higher
increase in learning outcomes for low-knowledge
learners (Mpre = 29.36, SE = 2.25; Mimmediate = 59.43,
SE = 2.31) compared to higher-knowledge learners
Table 6. Means (SD) of Test performance per task (max. score 1) per Condition of Experiment 2.
Instructional conditions
Blocked Examples Blocked Problems Interleaved Examples Interleaved Problems
Syllogism 1 Pretest 0.60 (0.51) 0.51 (0.52) 0.60 (0.51) 0.67 (0.48)
Immediate posttest 0.45 (0.51) 0.51 (0.51) 0.53 (0.52) 0.54 (0.51)
Delayed posttest 0.53 (0.52) 0.67 (0.48) 0.88 (0.53) 0.75 (0.44)
Syllogism 2 Pretest 0.15 (0.37) 0.40 (0.50) 0.13 (0.35) 0.26 (0.44)
Immediate posttest 0.70 (0.47) 0.51 (0.51) 0.87 (0.36) 0.56 (0.50)
Delayed posttest 0.53 (0.52) 0.64 (0.49) 0.75 (0.46) 0.78 (0.42)
Syllogism 3 Pretest 0.35 (0.49) 0.40 (0.50) 0.33 (0.49) 0.31 (0.47)
Immediate posttest 0.50 (0.51) 0.37 (0.49) 0.67 (0.49) 0.46 (0.51)
Delayed posttest 0.53 (0.52) 0.55 (0.51) 0.38 (0.52) 0.50 (0.51)
Base-rate 1 Pretest 0.30 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.33 (0.49) 0.46 (0.51)
Immediate posttest 0.90 (0.31) 0.53 (0.51) 0.73 (0.46) 0.64 (0.49)
Delayed posttest 0.87 (0.35) 0.61 (0.50) 0.75 (0.46) 0.75 (0.44)
Base-rate 2 Pretest 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Immediate posttest 0.30 (0.47) 0.05 (0.21) 0.47 (0.52) 0.03 (0.16)
Delayed posttest 0.20 (0.41) 0.03 (0.17) 0.25 (0.46) 0.00 (0.00)
Base-rate 3 Pretest 0.85 (0.37) 0.63 (0.49) 0.80 (0.41) 0.77 (0.43)
Immediate posttest 0.95 (0.22) 0.86 (0.35) 0.87 (0.35) 0.95 (0.22)
Delayed posttest 1.00 (0.00) 0.73 (0.45) 0.75 (0.46) 0.91 (0.30)
Conjunction 1 Pretest 0.20 (0.41) 0.35 (0.48) 0.33 (0.49) 0.41 (0.50)
Immediate posttest 0.60 (0.50) 0.84 (0.37) 0.87 (0.35) 0.82 (0.39)
Delayed posttest 1.00 (0.00) 0.73 (0.45) 0.75 (0.91) 0.91 (0.30)
Conjunction 2 Pretest 0.45 (0.50) 0.60 (0.50) 0.60 (0.51) 0.72 (0.46)
Immediate posttest 0.75 (0.44) 0.81 (0.39) 0.87 (0.35) 0.87 (0.34)
Delayed posttest 0.80 (0.41) 0.85 (0.36) 0.89 (0.33) 0.91 (0.30)
Conjunction 3 Pretest 0.55 (0.51) 0.77 (0.43) 0.87 (0.35) 0.79 (0.41)
Immediate posttest 1.00 (0.00) 0.98 (0.15) 1.00 (0.00) 0.95 (0.22)
Delayed posttest 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.97 (0.18)
Wason selection 1 Immediate posttest 0.07 (0.26) 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.33) 0.13 (0.37)
Delayed posttest 0.00 (0.00) 0.09 (0.29) 0.22 (0.44) 0.09 (0.30)
Wason selection 2 Immediate posttest 0.13 (0.35) 0.21 (0.42) 0.33 (0.50) 0.31 (0.47)
Delayed posttest 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.24) 0.00 (0.00) 0.90 (0.30)
Contingency 1 Immediate posttest 0.60 (0.51) 0.67 (0.48) 0.56 (0.53) 0.56 (0.50)
Delayed posttest 0.80 (0.41) 0.76 (0.44) 0.78 (0.44) 0.69 (0.47)
Contingency 2 Immediate posttest 0.47 (0.52) 0.52 (0.51) 0.56 (0.53) 0.53 (0.51)
Delayed posttest 0.80 (0.41) 0.88 (0.33) 0.56 (0.53) 0.72 (0.46)
Note: The reported immediate posttest means are based on analysis 1, that is, the pretest to immediate posttest analysis for all students present
during session 1.
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(Mpre = 51.14, SE = 2.38; Mimmediate = 70.77, SE =
2.34). Interestingly, our results revealed an inter-
action between Test Moment, Practice-task
Format, and Site. Follow-up analyses revealed that
low-knowledge learners showed a larger increase
in learning outcomes when they practiced with
worked examples (Mpre = 27.58, SE = 2.83;
Mimmediate = 70.30, SE = 4.28) compared to practice
problems (Mpre = 31.14, SE = 2.63; Mimmediate =
48.55, SE = 2.94), F(1, 53) = 22.17, p < .001, h2p = .30.
For higher-knowledge learners, the differences in
learning gains between the worked examples and
practice problems conditions were no longer signifi-
cant, F(1, 56) = 3.00, p = .089, h2p = .05.
The second analysis – to test whether our results
are still present after two weeks – showed a signifi-
cant main effect of Test Moment: participants’ per-
formance on learning items improved from
immediate (M= 63.13, SE = 2.19) to delayed (M=
67.71, SE = 2.31) posttest. In contrast to Hypotheses
3a, 5a, and 6a respectively, there was no main effect
of Practice Schedule, no main effect of Practice-task
Format, no interaction between Practice Schedule
and Practice-task Format, nor interactions with
Test Moment. Again, there was a main effect of
Site: higher-knowledge learners performed higher
on learning items (M= 72.73, SE = 2.49) than low-
knowledge learners (M= 58.11, SE = 3.26). Further-
more, an interaction between Practice Schedule,
Practice-task Format, and Site was found. Follow-
up analyses revealed that, for low-knowledge lear-
ners practice in a blocked schedule worked best
with worked examples compared to practice pro-
blems (MWE = 69.14, SE = 5.78; MPS = 47.57, SE =
4.34), while in an interleaved schedule practice pro-
blems were more beneficial (MWE = 52.78, SE =
12.27; MPS = 62.96, SE = 5.01), F(1, 35) = 4.43, p
= .043, h2p = .11. There was no significant interaction
between Practice Schedule and Practice-task
Format for higher-knowledge learners, F(1, 45) =
1.87, p = .178, h2p = .04. No other interaction effects
were found.
Mental effort during learning
Mental effort data are presented in Table 5 and
omnibus test statistics in Table 7. Contrary to
Hypotheses 2 and 4, respectively, a 2 (Practice Sche-
dule: interleaved and blocked) × 2 (Practice-task
Format: worked examples and practice problems) ×
2 (Site: low prior knowledge learners and higher
prior knowledge learners) factorial ANOVA on the
mental effort during practice data revealed no
main effects of Practice Schedule and Practice-task
Format, nor an interaction between Practice Sche-
dule and Practice-task Format was found. Moreover,
no main effect of Site, nor interactions between
Practice Schedule, Practice-task Format, and Site
were found.
Mental effort during test
Our pretest-immediate posttest analyses on effort
invested on learning items showed no main effects
of Practice Schedule (Question 7a) and Practice-
task Format (Question 8a), nor an interaction
between Practice Schedule and Practice-task
Format. The results did reveal a significant inter-
action between Test Moment, Practice Schedule,
and Site, but follow-up analyses revealed no signifi-
cant interactions between Test Moment and Prac-
tice Schedule for both sites (maximum F = 3.47,
maximum h2p = .06). No main effects of Test
Moment and Site, nor other significant interactions
were found.
Our second analysis – to test whether our results
were still present after two weeks – showed nomain
effects of Practice Schedule (Question 7b) and Prac-
tice-task Format (Question 8b), nor an interaction
between Practice Schedule and Practice-task
Format. However, a three-way interaction between
Test Moment, Practice Schedule, and Practice-task
Format was found. Follow-up analyses revealed
that interleaved practice with worked examples
resulted in an immediate posttest – delayed postt-
est increase in effort investment (Mimmediate = 3.58;
Mdelayed = 3.97) and with practice problems in an
immediate posttest – delayed posttest decrease in
effort investment (Mimmediate = 4.45; Mdelayed =
4.07), F(1, 36) = 4.21, p = .047, h2p = .11. There was
no significant difference in immediate posttest –
delayed posttest effort investment between the
practice-task format conditions when practiced in
a blocked schedule, F(1, 43) = 2.74, p = .105, h2p
= .06. No main effects of Test Moment and Site,
nor other interactions were found.
Our analyses on effort invested in transfer items
revealed no main effects of Practice Schedule, Prac-
tice-task Format, Test Moment, or Site. Moreover,
there were no significant interaction effects.
Interim summary
The results of Experiment 2 provide converging evi-
dence with Experiment 1. Again, we did not find any
indications that interleaved practice would be more
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beneficial than blocked practice for learning, either
in itself or as a function of task format. There was
again a benefit of studying worked examples over
solving problems, but – as was to be expected –
this was limited to participants who had low prior
knowledge (i.e. had not participated in a study
that included similar heuristics and biases tasks in
the first year of their curriculum).
General discussion
Previous research has demonstrated that providing
students with explicit CT-instructions combined
with practice on domain-relevant tasks is beneficial
for learning to reason in an unbiased manner (e.g.
Heijltjes et al., 2015) but not for transfer to new
tasks. Therefore, the present experiments investi-
gated whether creating contextual interference in
instruction through interleaved practice – which
has been proven effective in other and similar
domains – would promote both learning and trans-
fer of reasoning skills.
In line with our expectations and consistent with
earlier research (e.g. Van Peppen et al., 2018;
Heijltjes et al., 2015), both experiments support
the finding that explicit instructions combined
with practice improves learning of unbiased reason-
ing (Hypothesis 1), as we found pretest to immedi-
ate posttest gains on practiced tasks in all
conditions, which remained stable on the delayed
posttest after two weeks. This is in line with the
idea of Stanovich (2011) that providing students
with relevant mindware (i.e. knowledge bases,
rules, procedures and strategies; Perkins, 1995)
and stimulating them to inhibit incorrectly used
intuitive responses (i.e. Type 1 processing, e.g.
Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Stanovich,
2011; Stanovich et al., 2016) and to replace
these with more analytical and effortful reasoning
(i.e. Type 2 processing) is useful to prevent biases
in reasoning and decision-making. However, the
scores were not particularly high (i.e. up to 73%
accuracy), so there is still room for improvement.
The performance gain on practiced tasks suggests
that having learners repeatedly retrieve to-be-
learned material (i.e. repeated retrieval practice:
e.g. Karpicke & Roediger, 2007) may be a promising
method to further enhance learning to avoid biased
reasoning.
Contrary to our hypotheses, we did not find any
indications that interleaved practice would improve
learning more than blocked practice (Hypothesis
3a), regardless of whether they practiced with
worked examples or problem-solving tasks (Hypoth-
esis 6a). These findings are in contrast to previous
studies that demonstrated that interleaved practice
is effective for establishing both learning and trans-
fer in other domains and with other complex judg-
ment tasks (e.g. Likourezos et al., 2019). Moreover,
they are contrary to the finding of Paas and Van
Merriënboer (1994) that high variability during prac-
tice with geometrical problems produced test per-
formance benefits when students studied worked
examples, but not when they solved practice pro-
blems. Unfortunately, we were not able to test our
hypotheses regarding transfer performance
(Hypothesis 3b/6b). Therefore, it is unknown
whether interleaved practice – either in itself or as
a function of task-format – would be beneficial for
transfer of unbiased reasoning. However, given
that the transfer scores were overall rather low, we
can assume the overall effect of instruction and
practice (if present at all) would seem to be limited.
One of the more interesting findings to emerge
from this study, however, is that the worked
example effect (e.g. Paas & Van Gog, 2006; Renkl,
2014) also applies to CT-tasks. Moreover, this was
found even though the instructions that preceded
the practice tasks already included two worked
examples. As most of the studies on the worked
example effects used pure practice conditions or
gave minimal instructions prior to practice, these
examples could have helped students in the
problem-solving conditions perform better on the
practice problems; nevertheless, we still found a
worked example effect. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the results of Experiment 1 demonstrated
for the first time in CT-instruction a benefit of study-
ing worked examples over solving problems on
learning outcomes, reached with less effort during
the tests (i.e. more effective and efficient, Van Gog
& Paas, 2008). Experiment 2 replicated the worked
example effect (i.e. more effective than solving pro-
blems) and demonstrated that this was the case for
novices, but not for learners with relatively more
prior knowledge. This observation supports
findings regarding the expertise reversal effect (e.g.
Kalyuga, 2007; Kalyuga et al., 2003, 2012), which
shows that while instructional strategies that assist
learners in developing cognitive schemata are
effective for low-knowledge learners, they are
often not effective (or may even be detrimental)
for higher-knowledge learners. As far as we know,
our second experiment was the first to actually
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vary both level of guidance (i.e. practice-task format)
and level of expertise along with practice schedule
and, thus, our study provides a first step in exploring
the interactions between these factors. However,
caution is warranted in interpreting this finding
since our sample size was relatively small. It would
be interesting in future research to manipulate stu-
dents’ level of expertise to actually demonstrate a
causal relationship between expertise and the
effect of studying worked examples on learning out-
comes in CT-instruction.
Admittedly, our explanation for the worked
example effect would have been more compelling
if we had included measures of the separate types
of cognitive load (although it seems very challen-
ging to distinguish between different types of cog-
nitive load and available instruments, e.g. the rating
scale developed by Leppink et al., 2013, would be
too long to apply after each task). There are theor-
etical reasons to assume that the amount of strategy
information given in the worked examples resulted
in lower extraneous load and higher germane load
compared to solving problems, but in that case,
the total load experienced by the learners (as
reflected in their invested mental effort) may not
differ between conditions. Moreover, studies in
which worked examples were compared to practice
problems with feedback consisting of or resembling
the supportive features of worked examples, still
showed a worked example effect. Paas and Van Mer-
riënboer (1994), for instance, showed that training
with worked examples was more beneficial for
learning than training with practice-problems that
were followed by correct-answer feedback and
worked examples. Moreover, training with worked
examples required less time and was perceived as
less effortful. In line with these findings, both
McLaren et al. (2016) and Schwonke et al. (2009)
demonstrated that worked examples were less
time consuming without a loss or even a gain in
learning outcomes compared to tutored learning
by problem-solving (i.e. clear efficiency benefits of
worked example study). It is important to note
that the worked example effect does apply to lear-
ners who have little prior knowledge while it disap-
pears for learners with high prior knowledge (cf.
expertise reversal effect). In the current study, lear-
ners were provided with prior knowledge during
the initial CT-instructions. We nevertheless revealed
a worked example effect. Hence, it seems that par-
ticipants did not develop such expertise that the
positive effect of worked examples disappeared.
This allowed learners to still take advantage from
the information provided in the worked examples.
If learners have not learned from the initial instruc-
tions at all (which is unlikely given previous
research), the elaborate information in the worked
examples may have helped them to apprehend
the needed approach to problem solving, while
the information in the practice problems and sub-
sequent feedback whether the answer was correct
or incorrect could at best hint at what might be a
reasonable approach.
Finally, one could argue that the unequal cell dis-
tribution (i.e. higher exclusion in worked examples
conditions compared to practice problems con-
ditions based on reading time of instructions) may
indicate that students’ motivation may have been
the basis for the worked example effect. However,
our intention-to-treat analyses still revealed a
worked example effect and, therefore, this possible
explanation does not seem convincing. Yet, this
points to another remarkable finding, that is, that
worked examples were more beneficial for learning
than problems, even if the examples were minimally
read; possibly, students quickly located and pro-
cessed the relevant information in the examples.
Although we have to speculate, a possible expla-
nation for the absence of an interleaved practice
effect on learning outcomes might lie in the distinc-
tiveness between the task categories, which may
have been greater than in previous studies. Effects
of interleaved practice only occur if task categories
differ and require different problem-solving pro-
cedures. However, as reflection on the to-be-used
procedures is what causes the beneficial effect of
interleaved practice (e.g. Barreiros et al., 2007; Rau
et al., 2010), distinctiveness between categories
should not be too high because learners then
immediately recognise what procedure to apply. It
seems possible that the task categories used in
the present study were the same at a high level
but that the mindware needed for each category
differed too much. If so, determining the nature of
each task was relatively easy and intertask compar-
ing was not necessary. It should be noted, though,
that this was not expected in advance and that
arguing that the distinctiveness between task cat-
egories was too high after we know the results is
risky, because of hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975).
Another, again speculative, possible explanation
for the absence of an interleaving effect on learning
outcomes, might be that the surface characteristics
within the practice-task categories were so different
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(especially for the base-rate items) that students in
the blocked practice condition did not realise that
strategies could be reused in subsequent tasks of
that category. This suggestion is supported by the
performance differences on base-rate and syllogistic
reasoning items, although the latter is more likely
due to differences in difficulty. To reiterate, in the
blocked practice condition, participants practiced
with three tasks of one category at a time before
the next (e.g. AAABBBCCC), whereas in the inter-
leaved practice condition, participants practiced
with the nine heuristics-and-biases tasks in a
mixed sequence (e.g. ABCBACBCA). As such, stu-
dents in the blocked practice condition might
have been stimulated as much as students in the
interleaved practice condition to stop and think
about new problem-solving strategies, especially
in base-rate tasks. It seems possible that interleaved
practice is useful for practice within a task category
in which surface characteristics are similar to each
other and problem-solving procedures differ slightly
(e.g. syllogistic reasoning tasks), but further research
should be undertaken to investigate this.
Additionally, a recent meta-analysis (Brunmair &
Richter, 2019) has shown that the strength of inter-
leaved practice effects varies widely between types
of learning materials. Interleaved practice seems to
work well in inductive learning, when the stimuli
are complex, when categories are difficult to dis-
criminate, and when the similarity of exemplars
within categories is low. Given the pervasiveness
of induction, it is surprising that educationally rel-
evant materials are clearly underrepresented in
the interleaved practice research. The present
study was the first to address interleaved practice
effects with heuristics-and-biases tasks, and seems
to indicate that interleaved practice is not beneficial
for learning of this type of task. Hence, it would be
interesting for future studies to investigate the gen-
eralizability of the interleaved practice effects and
whether it is restricted to specific types and combi-
nations of learning materials. More generally, our
findings raise questions about the preconditions of
instructional strategies that are known to foster
generative processing (e.g. desirable difficulties;
Bjork, 1994). Instructional strategies, such as inter-
leaved practice, depend highly on the implemen-
tation, the measure of learning outcomes, and the
specific characteristics of the learning materials.
Further research on the exact boundary conditions
is therefore recommended to accurately inform
educational practice.
Moreover, it should be noted that the relatively
low reliabilities, implying high amounts of measure-
ment error, of our learning test items might have
played a crucial role as it largely decreased the
power to detect intervention effects (Cleary et al.,
1970; Kanyongo et al., 2007; Schmidt & Hunter,
1996). Although sample sizes as in studies like this
do not seem to produce sufficiently precise alpha
coefficients (e.g. Charter, 2003), the possibility that
the items were not sufficiently related or that stu-
dents do not see the overlap between the items
should be taken into account. In this study, the
low levels of reliability can probably be explained
in terms of multidimensionality of the tests encom-
passing several heuristics-and-biases tasks, a factor
often ignored in current research. Performance on
these tasks depends not only on the extent to
which that task elicits a bias (resulting from heuristic
reasoning), but also on the extent to which one pos-
sesses the requisite mindware (e.g. rules or logic or
probability). Thus, systematic variance in perform-
ance on such tasks can either be explained by a
person’s use of heuristics or his/her available mind-
ware. If it differs per item to what extent a correct
answer depends on these two aspects, there may
not be a common factor explaining all interrelation-
ships between the measured items. Future research,
therefore, would need to find ways to improve CT
measures (i.e. decrease random measurement
error) or should utilise measures known to have
acceptable levels of reliability (LeBel & Paunonen,
2011). The latter option seems challenging,
however, as multiple studies report rather low
levels of reliability of tests consisting of heuristics
and biases tasks (Aczel et al., 2015; Bruine de Bruin
et al., 2007; West et al., 2008) and revealed concerns
with the reliability of widely used standardised CT
tests, particularly with regard to subscales (Bernard
et al., 2008; Ku, 2009; Leppa, 1997; Liu et al., 2014).
One could argue to what extent the tests accu-
rately assessed the more general cognitive capacity
“avoiding bias in reasoning” (i.e. unbiased reason-
ing). Bias refers to systematic deviations from a
norm when choosing actions or estimating prob-
abilities (Stanovich et al., 2016; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). In the current study, unbiased reasoning was
operationalised as performance on classical heuris-
tics-and-biases tasks, in which an intuitively cued
heuristic response conflicts normative models of
CT as set by formal logic and probability theory.
Heuristics-and-biases tasks have been used for
decades to measure unbiased reasoning (e.g.
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Baron, 2008; Evans, 2003; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992;
Heijltjes et al., 2014a; Heijltjes et al., 2014b, 2015;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Stanovich et al., 2016;
Stanovich & West, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman,
1983; Van Brussel et al., 2020; Wasserman et al.,
1990; West et al., 2008). Several studies demon-
strated associations between people’s performance
on heuristics-and-biases tasks and how they reason
in more realistic settings (e.g. medical decision
making: Arkes, 2013) and other real-world correlates
(e.g. risk behaviours: Toplak et al., 2017). Hence, par-
ticipants’ performance on these heuristics-and-
biases tasks presumably offers a realistic view of
everyday reasoning (see for example, Gilovich
et al., 2002). Relevant next steps would be to inves-
tigate how bias in reasoning can be prevented in
daily settings and what the effects of instruction/
practice are on other aspects of CT.
To conclude, the present experiments provide
evidence that worked examples can be effective
for novices’ learning to avoid biased reasoning.
However, there were no indications that practice
in an interleaved schedule – with worked examples
or practice problems – enhances performance on
heuristics-and-biases tasks. These findings suggest
that the nature or the combination of the task cat-
egories may be a boundary condition for effects of
interleaved practice on learning and transfer.
Further research should be undertaken to investi-
gate what the exact boundary conditions of
effects of interleaved practice are and to provide
more insight into the expertise-reversal effect in
CT-instruction. Moreover, future research could
investigate whether other types of (generative)
activities would be beneficial for establishing learn-
ing and transfer of unbiased reasoning and whether
it is feasible at all to teach students to inhibit Type 1
processing and to recognise when Type 2 proces-
sing is needed. It is important to continue the
search for effective methods to foster transfer,
because biased reasoning can have huge negative
consequences in situations in both daily life and
complex professional environments.
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